An Introduction to the Plain Meaning Rule
At its core, the plain meaning rule is a principle that is used during the process of statutory interpretation to help determine the objective meaning of a text. It is often considered the starting point of any review of a legal provision, as it allows for a direct look at the words used before considering any other factors. Further, in some jurisdictions, it is also touted as one of the main tools in the judicial toolbox.
In Canada, the possibility for the rule to be applied was first announced by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Miller v. The Queen . In that case, Justice McIntyre said: …in cases of doubt it seems to me the only valid approach is to ascertain and give effect, so far as possible, to the plain meaning of the words used and that, if the language used reveals no ambiguity or doubt, a Court is bound in principle and by authority to give it effect.
Often viewed as a sibling to the golden rule, the two can often be confused, yet they are distinct in how they determine how to approach the interpretation of a statute. The golden rule does not always start from the plain meaning of the text, and is much more flexible than the plain meaning rule, which always starts from the words used. This snap definition is useful to remember as you think through the role of the plain meaning rule — it is the start of the inquiry for interpretation, and not the end.
A Brief History and Evolution of the Rule
In the common law system, the plain meaning rule has its roots in the early 16th century when judges began using Latin maxims and principles to interpret legislation. That said, its application in statutory construction was not uniform across jurisdictions. The first interpretive rule of statutory interpretation was put forth in 1636 in Heydon’s Case, where courts were required to look at the purpose of the legislation (mischief) and the remedy then viewed the intention behind the legislation.
As a reaction to the Heydon’s Case rule, several rules were presented as alternatives, which were later codified into canons of construction. In 1789, Cicero used the phrase "ubi lex non distinguit, non distinguitur, cui per omnia scripta est." In English, "where no distinction is made by the law, also none shall be made." Cicero’s rule limits the judicial role to that of interpreting the law and eliminates the need for judicial inventiveness. Another variation came in 1773 when Lord Chesterfield stated: "If an act is inexplicit, if there is an ambiguity, if there is a want of precision, the judge would avoid troublesome inquiry….The judge should look at the intention that dictated it." This method emphasizes that the intent of the law is primary and induces the judge to discern and then to apply that intention. Thereafter, the rule was ultimately referred to as the Golden Rule, the Mischief Rule or the Rule in Heydon’s Case.
The misleading name "Golden Rule" originated from Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury who referred the rule as such in Cape Brandy Syndicate Ltd. v The IRC, in 1921. It is therefore now commonly referred to as the "Golden Rule" for interpretation.
Application of the Rule in Judicial Proceedings
The application of the plain meaning rule has been considered and developed through various court cases. In the 1920 case of Caminetti v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States cited back to the specific language in the Harrison act—specifically the words "any person" and "knowingly"—when deciding that the legislature was not intending to cover state lines but instead intended to regulate interstate drug traffickers, not just drug users. In the 2007 United States v. Hayes case, the Supreme Court again used the plain meaning doctrine to uphold a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court had ruled that "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" referred not only to those whose information is already on file with the authorities in cases of domestic violence, but the phrase can also refer to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence where the perpetrator was not charged. An appellate court of the State of Connecticut determined in 2015 that the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection was misinterpreting the statute in Ruling Letter 2014-1, upon determining what the term "land reg. cert." actually meant to the Department in the ruling. The interpretation of the plain meaning doctrine in the case law clearly shows the need for precise language, and how simply one additional word can alter the reading and meaning of legislation.
The Advantages of Relying on the Plain Meaning Rule
Advantages of the plain meaning rule include simplicity and predictability and are strong arguments for its use. Applying the plain meaning rule often results in clarity of requirements and ensures that the statute is applied consistently across similar fact patterns. This mitigates the risks of a judge or jury implementing policies based on their own beliefs, values, or attitudes.
Plain meaning also avoids or minimizes the conflicts faced with the relationship between statutes, regulations, and case law. "[U]nder the plain meaning rule courts (and administrative agencies) do not look to legislative history or case law generally when interpreting statutes at all; case law may only be consulted when there is a possible ambiguity in the language of the statute being interpreted." 4A-11 Tony M. Rocco, Methods of Statutory Interpretation, § 11.32, LexisNexis American Law Encyclopedia (2d ed. 2009) (subscription required) (emphasis added). The plain meaning rule believes that, when there is a conflict between statutory language and case law, the statutory language should control.
However, because the plain meaning rule results in the application of the "plain meaning" of the words, as opposed to the intent of the drafters, application of the rule does not ensure that the "plain meaning" of the statute is desirable.
The Criticism and Some Limitations of the Rule
The plain meaning rule has not been immune to criticism. Some argue that the rule may yield arbitrary and confusing results in particular cases. The rule may also frustrate legislative intent where the drafters have not provided clear guidance on the ordinary meaning of a particular word or phrase. In other instances, the plain meaning rule may produce unjust results contrary to a court’s sense of justice.
The Canadian Supreme Court addressed some of these concerns in Rizzo & Rizzo Ltd., Re, where it said: The words of statutes must be read in their entire context, not "in pejus" (in a worse way) as it were, and the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, the intention of the legislature, the preamble, and the background of the enactment must all be looked at. This process must be a fair and reasonable one. Although I agree that the immediate context must be looked at, the definition section as a whole must not be ignored. … However , the principle of reading the words in their context is not limited to the immediate context. Thus, the relevant context for the interpretation of a word or phrase is not necessarily limited to its neighbouring clauses. … [A]n interpretative analysis involves a consideration of the statute as a whole, including the preamble, the definition section and the nature of the statute, and the interpretation should be consistent with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of the legislature.
As such, the Court advocated a contextual approach where a court examines the content of an enactment as a whole while being sensitive to the words used by the legislature. The challenge remains, however, that words are imperfect vehicles for meaning and context requires interpretation in itself. The approach also fails to consider that the legislature may have left the interpretation of an enactment ambiguous, in which case the courts need to justify assigning a meaning.
How the Rule Compares to Other Rules of Interpretation
The plain meaning rule, while pivotal in statutory interpretation and construction, has its strengths and weaknesses when compared with other traditional rules of statutory interpretation. For example, the golden rule, focuses on finding a meaning of the statute that carries out the intention of Parliament. The golden rule applies when a literal interpretation of a statute creates an absurdity, but the court believes that a different meaning would avoid the absurdity without altering the intention of the legislature. The golden rule allows for judicial adaptation of the words chosen by the legislature, so long as it does not alter the clear intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.
Appliance Refinishers Int’l Union, Glaziers Local 1162 Pension Trust Fund v New York Times Co., 878 F Supp 474 [S D NY 1995], involved the increase of benefits under a defined pension plan. Analysis of the statutory language used in the plan required a determination as to whether the words "contractually" and "accrued" were ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Under the golden rule, the court held that the term "contractually accrued" was an ambiguous phrase, as commonly understood, because it could refer to benefits that vest after the participant’s last day of employment. However, the court found that "contractual accrual" was used by the legislature in a technical sense in the pension plan context and that the dispute "can be resolved without development of legislative history showing legislative intent to use ‘contractual’ in a technical fashion."
The plain meaning rule, unlike the golden rule, does not permit the court to stray from the intent of the legislature in favor of the obvious meaning of the statute. For example, the mischief rule is similar to the golden rule, but even more focused on the intention of the legislature. The mischief rule focuses on the intention of the legislature with respect to the evil that it sought to correct and requires the court to look beyond the plain meaning and consider the statutory purpose.
In Laubach v State of New York Fr Tr, 50 Misc 3d 1218[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51324[U] [Ct Cl 2016], a case involving a claim for wrongful incarceration, the court looks to the mischief rule to determine Legislative intent when the language of a statute. The Legislature specifically intended to protect qualified non-culpable innocent citizens from the "mischief" of spending years in prison for a crime they did not commit. This intent is readily apparent from the language of the statute itself. Although opposing any extension of the act, the Appellate Division in Gold v State of New York, 118 AD3d 546 [1st Dept 2014, review denied 24 NY3d 991 [2014]] confirmed that the plain meaning rule appropriately applied and that "the court must give that limitation its plain and ordinary meaning." In Laubach, the court further looks to the legislative history, where a statement to the legislature by the Governor could help conclude the applicability of the plain meaning rule over the mischief rule.
The Future of the Rule in a Statutory World
The legacy of the plain meaning rule, particularly in common law jurisdictions that hold stare decisis as a core principle, can be measured by the significant number of cases that focus on the onus of statutory interpretation placed upon judges. Although the plain meaning rule has its critics, breaking down the barriers between strict and loose textualism is not likely to occur in the near future. Instead, most reform movement actors strive for some balance between modern-day liberal approaches and historical textualism. Even with the rise of textualism in US courts (led by the Supreme Court and heavily adopted by lower level reviewing courts), there are more moderate acts of textualism (with judicial behaviours such as jurisprudence methodologies often incorporating a mixed bag of interpretation theories). At the same time, we may begin to see a greater pushback of strict interpretation in the European Union. The plain meaning rule has long been in a state of decline, which signifies a weakening in the force of precedent (precedent is important in Europe where there is binding precedence in a judicial hierarchy, which may have an impact on how individual plaintiffs attribute meaning to precedential cases). Overall, the future of the plain meaning rule, including reforming judicial approaches, will rely in part on the nuanced behaviours of judges around the world (with external factors playing a huge role).
Meanwhile the UK Supreme Court is probed about whether or not it should apply (or at least consider) common law principles of interpretation of contracts into interpretation practices of statutes[i]. Courts have recognized that most British and Anglo-American techniques of interpretation have sources in contract interpretation, so future dialogue regarding the impact of one to another may result in a fresh reconsideration of the plain meaning rule (or its application, as the rule was applied historically).
The plain meaning rule and its doctrines may be incorporated in other areas of law which forces judges to make links in developing precedent that stretches purpose-based reasoning (more liberal approaches) to combine prior jurisprudence in favour of the strict and exclusionary (or textualist) perspectives. This impacts the autonomy of the individual classifications of the plain meaning doctrine. To compensate for this encroachment, judges may bring forward alternative approaches to enhance the strict, solely textualist based interpretations. Regardless, the plain meaning rule will continue to attract criticism internationally, with hopes that it will become republished in part or whole in various forms.
The Pluralistic perspective on pluralism forces us to juggle between reform efforts based on the sole understanding of jurisprudence (where legal knowledge is built on literature and through legal exercises) and the idea that legal knowledge is inextricably linked to other sources of knowledge (and disciplines of study) which reform efforts advocate for legal considerations to be descriptive and pluralistic (and therefore reconciliatory). Instead, legal scholars and practitioners can begin to map out a hybrid model of interpretation that does not fall entirely into one of the main schools of thought on interpretation (but may still share commonalities with them).
The Conclusion
In conclusion, we have examined the establishment of the plain meaning rule early in the formation of common law and how it has persisted throughout American history, well into the 2010s. The plain meaning rule continues to be the most significant rule, utilized not only by lawyers but also judges and scholars alike . Although stylistically different, all these parties agree on the importance and necessity of the rule to properly convey the meaning of a legal text. The plain meaning rule is as relevant now in determining the proper interpretation of legal texts as when it was first adopted, and will remain relevant towards the future of legal interpretation.